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EROSIONS OF CAVEAT EMPTOR

ultimate judicial power within the union, making the dominant faction in
the union subject to some superior law. It also eliminates the need for
judicial review insofar as detecting bias is concerned since such review
bodies act not only as arbiters of unresolved disputes but also as watchdogs over the union's internal disciplinary mechanisms. The attributes
of public review would appear to best circumvent the institutional peculiarities of the union.
Dr. Clark Kerr, one of the original members of the UAW's Public
Review Board, summarized the broader problem succinctly:
The union, like every other major institution in an increasingly industrialized nation, has become more distant from its members. In the
process of centralization the union administration has tended to take on
a life and power of its own. The individual member remains the
theoretical source of authority within the organization, but in a struggle
with his own officers he is, more often than not, unable to muster the
resources to make his sovereignty meaningful. The odds are with the
administration.61
While independent judiciaries would not totally eliminate bias from union
proceedings, they would help reverse the odds. Independent review would
remind union leadership of the importance of due process principles as
applied to internal institutions, and in this respect would strengthen existing disciplinary apparatus. It would also make evident to all members
the close relationship that exists between the ends of justice and the means
by which they are attained. 2 The correlation between union democracy
and union strength is obvious, and only when more union leaders demonstrate the courage and wisdom to abdicate some of their own power to independent review bodies will union members receive the "full and fair
hearing" guaranteed by the LMRDA.
GARBER A. DAVIDSON, JR.

Landlord and Tenant-Recent Erosions of Caveat Emptor in the
Leasing of Residential Housing
The maxim caveat emptor has threaded a path through many areas of
the law. While major modifications have occurred in some areas,' this
" DEMOCRACY & PUBLIC REVIEW, supra note 60, at 3.
02
Id. at 30-31.
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE §§ 2-314, -315; see 8 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
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dubious doctrine, with few exceptions, has tenaciously persisted in the
area of landlord and tenant law. However, recent decisions 2 in several
jurisdictions have virtually excised caveat emptor from residential leases
by implying either a warranty or covenant of habitability on the basis of
local housing codes. As defined by one court:
[I]t is a covenant that at the inception of the lease, there are no latent
defects in facilities vital to the use of the premises for residential purposes because of faulty original construction or deterioration from age
or normal usage. And further it is a covenant that these facilities will
remain in usable condition during the entire term of the lease. In performance of this covenant the landlord is required to maintain those
facilties in a condition which renders the property livable.3
While fundamental, it bears repetition that at common law a lease
was considered a conveyance of an estate in land.4 The concept of land
as the central element of the leasehold has yielded several important and
disadvantageous consequences for the lessee. Lease covenants, contrary
to the contracts rule, are assumed to be independent.3 The obligation to
pay rent might continue despite the lessor's breach of a covenant to
repair,0 or even despite the destruction of the premises.7 As the lessor has
parted with possession, he is under no obligation to repair in the absence
of express covenant or statute.' Where there are defects existing at the
§§ 983-89 (Jaeger ed. 1964); Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable
Quality,
27 MINN. L. REv. 117 (1943).
2
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Brown
v. Southall Realty Co., 23.7 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968); Lemle v. Breeden, 462
P.2d 470 (Hawaii, 1969); Lund v. McArthur, 462 P.2d 482 (Hawaii, 1969);
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper,
53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
'Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, -, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970).
' 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.2 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited
as Casner].
6 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 890 (Jaeger ed. 1962).
'E.g., Stone v. Sullivan, 300 Mass. 450, 15 N.E.2d 476 (1938).
"Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 63 (1809) ; Coogan v. Parker, 2 S.C. 255 (1871).
8 Casner § 3.78. The statutory duty to repair typically takes three forms.
The "repair and deduct" category applies broadly to any "building intended
for the occupation of human beings" and requires the lessor, in the absence of
contrary agreement, to put and maintain the premises in tenable condition. The
tenant has the alternative remedies of vacating or repairing the defect and deducting
the amount from the rent; the expenditures may not exceed one month's rent in
some of these statutes. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1941-42 (West 1954); MONT.
REv. CODES ANN. §§ 42-201, -202; N.D. CENT. CODE §47-16-12 (1960); OxLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §§31-32 (1954); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. §§43-38-8, -9
(1967). Another form applies only to "multiple dwellings" or "tenement houses"
and imposes specific duties. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 19-343 (1958); MASS.
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commencement of the term, the lessee takes "as is" and his "eyes are his
bargain." 9 Succinctly stated:
There is no implied covenant or warranty that at the time the term
commences the premises are in a tenable condition or that they are
adapted to the purpose for which leased. The tenant, then, cannot use
such unfitness ...

as a defense to rent....

The reason ...

is that the

tenant is the purchaser of an estate in land, subject to the doctrine of
caveat emptor. He may inspect the premises and determine for himself
their suitability or he may secure an express warranty. 10
The rule is not inexorable, however. One early exception was the
letting of a "furnished house" for a short term. In such instances caveat
emptor is thought inapplicable as the parties contemplate immediate occupation without prior inspection and "may be supposed to contract in
reference to a well understood purpose of the hirer to use it as a habitation."'" Despite infrequent extensions,' 2 this exception has been narrowly
construed and held applicable only to furnishings and defects existing at
the beginning of the term.' 3 Of more recent vintage is the rule implying
a covenant of fitness for the purpose leased where the lease restricts the
tenant to a particular use and is accepted by him before the premises are
completely constructed or altered.' 4 As in the "furnished house" situation,
the lack of opportunity for inspection is the stated rationale for implying the
covenant.
Further mitigation of the tenant's plight is afforded through the
doctrines of constructive eviction and the implied covenant of quiet
enjoyment. 15 By these theories, any act or omission of the landlord that
LAws ch. 144, §§ 66-89 (1965); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW §§ 78-80 (McKinney 1946). Others impose broad liability on all lessors and specifically allow an
action in tort for damages. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-111, -112 (1966) ; LA. Civ. CODE
ANN. arts. 2692-95 (1952). See generally, Feuerstein & Shestack, Landlord and
Tenant-The Statutory Duty to Repair, 45 ILL. L. Rtv. 205 (1950).
' Moore v. Weber, 71 Pa. 429, 432 (1872).
ANN.

10

11

Casner § 3.45.

Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 350, 31 N.E. 286 (1892) ; accord, Young v.
Povich, 121 Me. 141, 116 A. 26 (1922); Hackner v. Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 39
N.E.2d 644 (1942); cf. Franklin v. Brown, 118 N.Y. 110, 23 N.E. 126 (1889). See
Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability in Lease of Furnished Premises for
Short Term:Erosionof Caveat Em ptor, 3 U. RicH. L. REv. 322 (1969).
"' See, e.g., Delamater v. Foreman, 184 Minn. 428, 239 N.W. 148 (1931) (multiple apartment buildings, furnished or unfurnished).
" Davenport v. Squibb, 320 Mass. 629, 70 N.E.2d 793 (1947); Murray v.
Albertson, 50 N.J.L. 167, 13 A. 394 (1888).
" Woolford v. Electric Appliances, 24 Cal. App. 2d 3,85, 75 P.2d 112 (1938);
J.D. Young Corp. v. McClintic, 26 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
" Casner § 3.47; 2 R. PoWELL, REAL PROPERTY 225(3) (Rohan ed. 1967).
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renders the premises substantially unsuitable for their intended purpose or
that seriously interferes with the tenant's beneficial enjoyment is a breach
of the covenant and may constitute a constructive eviction. Both doctrines
evolved from a recognition that the common law estate theory did not
conform to modern urban life. 6 However, these doctrines have not fully
overcome the harshness of caveat emptor. The act or omission must be
substantial and of permanent effect.' 7 Moreover, the lessor must be under
some legal duty to act on the tenant's behalf. Lacking such duty, there
can be no constructive eviction.' Further, the tenant must abandon the
premises within a reasonable time on pain of waiver. "A tenant cannot
claim uninhabitability, and at the same time continue to inhabit.",
The logic is admirable, but the tenant's position is dilemmic. If the
breach is afterwards determined insubstantial, he is still liable on the
rental agreement; if he dallies too long, he is deemed to have waived the
defects.2 0 The abandonment requirement can itself be harsh; in periods
of adequate housing shortage the indigent tenant, in particular, may find
suitable housing difficult to obtain, if he can find any at all. 2 ' Some limited
relief from the abandonment rule has been afforded through the doctrines
of partial actual and partial constructive eviction,22 and also where the
" See Rapacz, Origin and Evolution of Constructive Eviction in the United
States,
1 DEPAUL L. REV. 69, 70 (1951).
17
Id. at 79-87.
"E.g., Hopkins v. Murphey, 233 Mass. 476, 124 N.E. 252 (1919).
" Two Rector Street Corp. v. Bein, 226 App. Div. 73, 76, 234 N.Y.S. 409, 412
(1929). See also Candell v. Western Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 156 Colo. 552, 400
P.2d 909 (1965) ; Richards v. Dodge, 150 So.2d 477 (Fla. 1963) ; Venters v. Reynolds, 354 S.W.2d 521 (Ky. 1962) ; 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 457 (1968).
2 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant §§ 455, 459 (1968). See Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d

638 (1963).

Poor tenants complain of housing code violations.., but they cannot move
away. They are immobilized by lack of funds or by their race. Code administrators hesitate to act because ... it may mean more evicted tenants
with no place to go.
21

P. WALD, LAW AND POVERTY: 1965 REPORT TO THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAW
AND POVERTY 14 (1965), cited in Gribetz and Grad, Housing Code Enforcement:

Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLum. L. REv. 1254, 1275 n.95 (1966). See also
Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEo. L.J.
519 (1966).
" It is well recognized that a partial actual eviction suspends the lessee's entire
rent obligation although he retains possession of the remainder of the premises.
The lessor may not apportion his wrong. See, e.g., Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917). Fewer courts have embraced the
theory of partial constructive eviction. In one case the lessee, with a "fortitude
born of desperation," remained in his fire gutted apartment while the lessor, as obligated, failed to promptly repair. Noting the acute housing shortage, the court held
it "intolerable that the tenant ... must cling to the naked possession of the un-
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tenant seeks equitable relief for breach of covenant.-3
In recent years several courts have endeavored to depart from caveat
emptor; three distinct approaches have added momentum to the judicial
efforts to circumvent that doctrine. Pines v. Perssion24 provided a major
impetus for this recent development. In Pines several students, prior
to leasing a furnished dwelling, inspected the premises and found them
admittedly "filthy." In reliance upon the lessor's oral promise to repair,
the lease was signed but no repairs were effected. After the students took
possession certain defects, latent at the time of leasing, caused the house to
be found in violation of the local building code. The tenants vacated and
sued to recover their rent deposit and other expenditures. Despite caveat
emptor, the court held they were not chargeable with knowledge of these
latent defects and held that an implied warranty of habitability existed.
While the court's decision was based on the early "furnished house"
exception, the reasoning was much broader:
Legislation and administrative rules, such as the safe place statute,
building codes, and health regulations, all impose certain duties on a
property owner with respect to the condition of his premises. Thus, the
legislature has made a policy judgment-that it is socially ... desirable
to impose these duties on a property owner-which has rendered the old
common law rule obsolete. To follow the old rule of no implied
warranty of habitability in leases would... be inconsistent with current
legislative policy concerning housing standards. The need and social
desirability of adequate housing for people in this era of rapid population
increases is too important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious legal clich6,
25

caveat emptor.

The breach of the warranty constituted a failure of consideration, and the
tenants, in recovering, were held liable only "for the reasonable rental
value of the premises during the period of actual occupancy." 2
inhabitable... without redress from the inexorable accrual of full rent." Johnson
v. Pemberton, 197 Misc. 739, -, 97 N.Y.S.2d 153, 155-56 (City of N.Y. Mun. Ct.
1950); See also Majen Realty Corp. v. Glotzer, 61 N.Y.S.2d 195 (City of N.Y.
Mun. Ct. 1946). The theory, however, does not completely extinguish liablity for
rent. Gombo v. Martise, 41 Misc. 2d 475, 246 N.Y.S.2d 750, rev'd, 44 Misc. 2d
239, 253 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. 1964). Most authority requires an eviction for
breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, at least where claimed in defense
to an action for rent. Moe v. Sprankle, 32 Tenn. App. 33, 221 S.W.2d 712 (1949);
49 Am. Jur. Landlord and Tenant § 333 (1970).
" Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 163 N.E.2d 4
(1959).
" 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
2Id. at 595-96, 111 N.W.2d at 412-13.
20 Id. at 597, 111 N.W.2d at 413. The rationale in Pines was followed in Buckner
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The court's rationale in Pines was later utilized by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper.17 In Reste the defendant
lessee had rented office space in a commercial building; during the first
year of occupancy, rainfall from an adjacent driveway caused periodic
flooding rendering the offices unsuitable for the lessee's purposes. With
knowledge of this defect, the lessee negotiated a second lease in reliance
on the lessor's oral promise to correct the flooding. No corrections were
made and the tenant abandoned after notice. Neither lease obligated the
lessor to repair, nor contained any warranty of fitness. In a suit for
accrued rent the lessor, as usual, asserted caveat emptor, and noted, particularly, the lease provisions reciting examination of the premises and
agreement to accept them in "present condition." The argument proved
unavailing:
It has come to be recognized that ordinarily the lessee does not have as
much knowledge of the condition of the premises as the lessor. Building
code requirements and violations are known or made known to the
lessor, not the lessee. He is in a better position to know of latent defects,
structural or otherwise ... which might go unnoticed by a lessee who
rarely has sufficient knowledge or expertise to discover them....
[In our judgment present day demands of fair treatment for tenants
with respect to latent defects remediable by the landlord . . . require
28
imposition on him of... a limited warranty of habitability.

v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967), in which the court found
an implied warranty of habitability and allowed the tenant to recover a prior rent
deposit. The court also held invalid a purported waiver of the lessor's duty to repair
under CAL. Civ. CoDE § 1941. However, the Pines rationale was recently emasculated
in Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970). The court refused
the tenant's request to hold that the lessor's compliance with a local housing code
was an implied covenant in the lease, reasoning
[to hold] that the housing code is implied in lease agreements .

.

. would

circumvent the existing enforcement procedures ... a tenant would withhold
rent and the case would then be taken into court by the landlord for ejectment, nonpayment of rent, or both ..

. judicial definition of terms in the

housing code would supplant administrative regulation.
Id. at -, 174 N.W.2d at 533. One reply is that administrative enforcement is frequently unsuccessful. Inspectors typically face masses of minor violations, problems
of overlapping agency jurisdiction, inspection, and sometimes difficult decisions in
determining the party to be held responsible. While criminal sanctions-the primary
enforcement mechanism-are potentially adequate (see N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW
§ 304 (McKinney Supp. 1970)), they have frequently proven ill-suited in effecting
the goals of maintenance and repair. See Gribetz and Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remwdies, 66 CoIum. L. REv. 1254 (1966); Comment,
Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REv. 801 (1965).
N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
Id. at 452-54, 251 A.2d at 272-73.

2753
ZS
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While the defects were obvious at the inception of the second and controlling lease, this fact did not preclude reliance upon the newly implied
-warranty due to the lessor's oral promise to repair, though "knowing
acceptance of a defective leasehold would normally preclude reliance upon
any implied warranties .... *29 Strangely, the court based its decision
on a more traditional ground holding that the tenant was constructively
evicted by breach of an express covenant of quiet enjoyment. It has been
urged that the result was unique since the covenant of quiet enjoyment
traditionally embraces only interference with the tenant's beneficial use
from conditions attributable to the lessor and manifested after occupancy,
but does not warrant initial fitness where, as here, there is no change of
condition. °
The dicta in Rste concerning the covenant of habitabiltiy was later
the ratio decidendi in Marini v. Ireland." The defendant lessee held
a one year apartment lease that contained an express covenant of quiet
-enjoyment but no covenant to repair. During occupancy, defects in the
plumbing caused flooding; repeated attempts to inform the lessor failed.
The lessee then employed self-help, had the plumbing repaired, and deducted the amount from the monthly rent. Drawing on Pines and Reste,
the New Jersey court reversed the lower court decision for the lessor in his
ejectment suit and held the self-help remedy available. Significantly, the
-court did not rely on the covenant of quiet enjoyment3 2 but, noting that
the lease prohibited use "for any other purpose than dwelling," concluded
that an implied covenant of habitability arose "because it is indispensable
to carry into effect the purpose of the lease .... "3
This approach of construing the terms of the lease raises the question
of whether a purported waiver of any implied covenants in the lease should
be given recognition. One authority cited in Marini considered it "well
settled that courts will not make a better . . . contract than the parties

themselves have seen fit to enter into."3' 4 The question is not academic; as
such covenants are increasingly implied, form leases will undoubtedly contain specific waivers of the covenants. The validity of such a waiver
Id. at 455, 251 A.2d at 274.
oSee Note, Landlord and Tenant: A Further Erosion of "Caveat Emptor":
v. Cooper, 31 U. PIrr. L. REv. 138 (1969).
Reste Realty Corporation
81 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
See Note, 31 U. PiTT. L. REv. 138, supra note 30.
265 A.2d at 533.
88 56 N.J. at -,

"William Berland Realty Co. v. Hahne & Co., 26 N.J. Super. 477, 486, 98 A.2d
124, 129 (1953).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

appears doubtful. Housing codes, even if not specific in placing the duty
of compliance on the lessor, are enacted, in part, for the tenant's benefit in
recognition of his frequent inequality of bargaining power." It is similarly
recognized that one cannot assume risk where a statute exists which thus
serves to protect a party from himself."0 Reste acknowledged this absence
of arms length dealing in landlord-tenant relations and, though reserving
decision on the issue, cited authority casting grave doubt that any waiver
would be upheld.

7

While the court in Marini considered the characterization of the new
covenant a "mere matter of semantics," the conclusion that a breach
"would constitute a constructive eviction" ' seems unfortunate. Unless
the court intended to embrace the as yet limited theory of partial constructive eviction,3 9 the lessee's retention of possession was inconsistent
with the abandonment requirement. The court, not unmindful of the
problem, observed:
It is of little comfort to a tenant in these days of housing shortage
to accord him, upon a constructive eviction, the right to vacate the premises and end his obligation to pay rent. Rather he should be accorded
the alternative remedy of terminating the cause of the constructive
eviction. 40

One must agree, and as the court's previous efforts in Reste suggest,
such analytical inconsistencies seem inherent in attempts to accommodate
new results within arguably outmoded property concepts.'
More unfortunate, however, were the limited remedies the court
allowed for breach of the new covenant. In Reste, the court took note of
the "drastic course" involved in abandonment and indicated approval of a
rule allowing the tenant to withhold a portion of the agreed rent and to
pay only the reduced "reasonable rental value" of the defective premises
"McNally v. Ward, 192 Cal. App. 2d 871, 14 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1961); Altz v.

Leiberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922).
" Finnigan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 218 P.2d 17; W. PROSSER,
LAW OF

7

TORTS § 67 (3d ed. 1964).

Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (disclaimer of implied warranties held no bar to tort recovery for defective auto;
Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 140 A.2d 199 (1958) (Tenement
House Act held to create tort liability) ; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 (unconscionable contract or clause).
38 56 N.J. at -, 265 A.2d at 534.
' See note 22 smpra.
,056 N.J. at -, 265 A.2d at 535.
"See Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1279 (1960).
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if he elected not to abandon. 42 Yet the court in Marini made it explicit
that "the tenant has only the alternative remedies of making the repairs
or removing from the premises. 4 Moreover, he may effect only such
repairs as "are reasonable in light of the value of the leasehold." 44 Such
a rule is of least benefit to the indigent tenant who, as noted, may have
no place to go if he abandons, but whose meager leasehold is most likely
in need of extensive repair. He is probably unable to afford additional
expenditures beyond the "reasonable" level if out of pocket.4"
Finally, it is clear that the covenant as announced by the New Jersey
court extends only to latent defects; the tenant who knowingly leases
premises in a defective state will have no remedy for breach of the covenant.
This qualification seems inconsistent with the court's acknowledgment
in Reste that "an awareness by legislatures of the inequality of bargaining
power between landlord and tenant in many cases, and the need for tenant
protection, has produced remedial tenement house and multiple dwelling
statutes."4 6 To the extent that residental leases are formed in an adhesive context 47 and the various housing codes evidence a legislative
determination that property owners must satisfy minimum duties of
maintenance, it seems incongruent that the indigent tenant in a "take-itor-leave-it" situation should be left exclusively to often inadequate administrative remedies. 8
In contrast to the constructive eviction approach utilized in Marini,
a more unique theory was employed by the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals in Brown v. Southall Realty Co.49 The landlord leased premises
which, at the time of letting, were known by him to be defective and in
violation of the housing code. When the tenant withheld rent, the lessor
sugd for possession. The tenant abandoned and disclaimed any future
liability for rent on the grounds of illegality. The court agreed and found
that the letting violated a regulation that "[N] o persons shall rent or offer
to rent any habitation... unless ... in repair." The letting was contrary
12 53 N.J. at 462 n.1, 251 A.2d at 277 n.1.
" 56 N.J. at -, 265 A.2d at 535 (emphasis added). Cf. Academy Spires, Inc.
v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (Dist. Ct. 1970).
"Id.
"See note 21 supra. See also Comment, The Indigent Tenant and the Doctrine
of Constructive Eviction, WAsH. U.L.Q. 461, 478 (1968).

"53 N.J. at 452, 251 A.2d at 272.
' 2 R. PoWELL, REAL PROPERTY 221 (1) (Rohan ed. 1967).
"See note 26 supra.
"237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968).
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to public policy, and the lease void and unforceable. ° The illegal contract
theory in Brown involved only pre-existing and known defects; its application to situations in which the defects and violations arise after the letting
is uncertain.51 It might be argued that the landlord's continued provision
of defective housing, despite initial compliance with the regulations, constitutes an illegal performance, renders an initially valid contract unenforceable and provides a good defense to an action for accrued rent
if the violations were "serious or more than an incidental part of the
performance."5 However, substantial authority would reject this reasoning: "There is no policy ...

against ...

recovery unless [the] contract

was illegal, and a contract is not necessarily illegal because it is carried
53
out in an illegal way."
The distinction appears unsound; what flouts public policy is the
prohibited performance, not the contract as such. Housing codes typically
require the lessor to maintain the premises in a healthy and safe condition.
The failure to do so is no less illegal than the act of originally leasing the
premises in a defective condition. It would be anomalous not to prohibit
54
the lessor's recovery in both cases.
The illegal contract theory produces the remedy of total rent withholding. Since the lease is void, the lessor may not assert it in an action
for rent or ejectment. However, like the solution in Marini, the illegal
contract theory may prove cold comfort to the indigent tenant. Entry
under a void lease uniformly creates a tenancy at will, terminable on either
reasonable or statutory notice. 5 The same result should obtain in the
case of supervening illegality. Thus, the theory may become a double
edged sword; a tenant might withhold his rent and successfully defend
0
an action for rent or possession, but subject himself to later ouster.6
A third approach in departing from the caveat emptor doctrine was
" Id. at 836-37; see also Jess Fisher & Co. v. Hicks, 86 A.2d 177 (D.C. App.
1952);
Leuthold v. Stickney, 116 Minn. 299, 133 N.W. 856 (1911).
51See
Saunders v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 245 A.2d 836 (D.C. App. 1968),
reVld sub nora. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

6 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1761 (Rev. ed. 1938).
Fox v. Rodgers, 171 Mass. 546, 547, 50 N.E. 1041, 1042 (1898) ; see Measday

v. Sweazea, 78 N.M. 781, 438 P.2d 525 (1968); cf. Tocci v. Lembo, 325 Mass. 707,
92 N.E.2d 254 (1950). See generally 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 190 (1963).
" See WILLISTON, supra note 52. See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTs § 608
(1932).

" Casner §§ 3.27-28, 3.91. See Diamond Housing Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A.2d

492 (D.C. App. 1969).
" See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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taken by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Lemle v. Breeden.57 The lessee's
furnished "Tahitian style" dwelling proved rat infested and was abandoned
within three days. While factually the case fell within the "furnished
house" exception, and the tenant urged constructive eviction, the court
eschewed both approaches. Unlike in Marini, the court asserted that "to
search for gaps and exceptions in a legal doctrine such as constructive
eviction which exists only because of the somnolence of the common law
and the courts is to perpetuate further judicial fictions when preferable
alternatives exist.""8 The preferable alternative was simply a rejection of
the "wooden rules of property law" and treatment of the lease as a bilateral
contract and sale of the premises for a term.5 9 The court, by thus analogizing a lease doctrinally to a sale and with additional assist from tort
authority, had little difficulty in concluding that lessor's superior bargaining power and opportunity to inspect and maintain his product imply
a warranty that the premises are suitable for their intended use as a
habitation. The usual contract remedies of damages, reformation, and
rescission are available to the lessee upon material breach, and the remedial
problems of constructive eviction are eliminated. 0
The implied warranty approach was recently followed in the District of
61
Columbia in Javins v. First National Realty Corporation. The tenants
urged that violations of the housing regulations occurring after the leasing
were a defense to the lessor's ejectment action. Regarding the treatment
of leases as contracts "wise and well considered," the court reviewed the
erosion of caveat emptor in consumer protection cases but declined to imply
a general warranty of habitability in all urban leases. Instead, drawing
on Brown, the court held that the housing regulations were implied terms
of the leases they covered and created a non-waivable duty to comply with
their standards. The opinion is suitably vague, however, on one result
of this interaction between lease and housing regulation. In the lower
court, the tenants argued both that the illegal contract theory of Brown
7 462 P.2d 470 (Hawaii 1969) ; See Lund v. MacArthur, 462 P.2d 482 (Hawaii
1969).
68462 P.2d at 475.
°See Lesar, supra note 41, at 1281.
60462 P.2d at 473-75; see note 1 supra, and see also Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) ; Carpenter
v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964) ; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) ; Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70,
207 A.2d 34 (1965); Jaeger, Product Liability: The Constructive Warranty, 39
DAME LAWYER 501 (1964).
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extended to violations arising after the letting and that the regulations imposed an implied contractual duty on the lessor to maintain the
property. Neither argument was accepted. 62 In reversing, the circuit court
of appeals skirted the issue of supervening illegality: "Under the Brown
holding, serious failure to comply. . . [with a regulation requiring
maintenance and repair] . . . before the least term begins renders the

contract void. We think it untenable to find that this section has no
effect on the contract after it has been signed. 01 3 What remains uncertain
is whether the "effect" of the regulations, in the case of defects arising
after the leasing, is relevant to the validity of the lease itself. Logically, it
would seem so. As the court in Javins acknowledged, under Brown the
existence of substantial defects at the time of leasing "renders the contract
void." The issue of illegality should not hinge on the fortuity of when the
defects arose.6 4 Moreover, an acknowledgment of illegality in both contexts-where the defects exist preceding the contract as well as where they
subsequently arise-need not be inconsistent with the implication of a
contractual duty enforceable by the tenant. Enforcement of an illegal
contract is typically allowed where the enforcement is sought by a party
who falls within the protected class for whose benefit the contract is judged
illegal. 5
Thus, from the tenant's viewpoint, the warranty and illegal contract
theories may merely provide an overlapping choice of remedies. More
problematical, however, is whether the lessor could assert the illegality of
the lease in either context in defense to an action for breach of his warranty,
thereby creating a tenancy at will and jeopardizing the lessee's right to
future possession. 6 The possibility apparently exists; if broader social
goals than tenant protection are served by code enforcement, then the
illegal leasing suggests an in pari delicto situation. The "protected class"
exception to the rule of non-enforcement of illegal contracts might not
apply, and the lessor could, paradoxically, benefit from his own illegal
behavior." Indeed, the court which decided Brown later intimated this
possibility:
2 Saunders
ca

v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 245 A.2cd 836 (D.C. App. 1968).
428 F.2d at 1081.

,See text at notes 52-54 supra.
See, e.g., Kneeland v. Emerton, 280 Mass. 371, 183 N.E.155 (1932) ; Loewenstein v. Midwestern Inv. Co., 181 Neb. 547, 149 N.W.2d 512 (1967) ; RESTATEmENT
OF CONTRACTS § 601 (1932).
" See authorities cited supra note 55.
67 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 272 (1963).
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EROSIONS OF CAVEAT EMPTOR

The Housing Regulations do not compel an owner of housing property
to rent his property... if the landlord is unwilling or unable to put
the property in a habitable condition, he may and should promptly
terminate the tenancy and withdraw the property from the rental
market, because the Regulations forbid both the rental and the oc8
cupancy of such premises
Of course, the thrust of Javins is contrary, but the problem is posed to
illustrate that the illegal contract and warranty theories, where they coexist, may prove conflicting.
Like Lemle, Javins accorded the usual contract remedies, including
specific performance, but also sanctioned the tenant's use of rent withholding. This remedy, first suggested in Reste, was later limited in
Marini by the "repair" requirement. Brown, in effect, allowed total rent
withholding but at the expense of voiding the lease. Upon breach of the
warranty, the lessee may withhold rent and need not effect repairs,
abandon, or institute suit. In an ejectment action, the lessor's breach, if
partial, results in liability only for the fair rental value of the premises in
their defective state; the lessee may retain possession if he tenders that
amount. If the breach is total, no rent is owed, and the ejectment action
fails.6 Moreover, the tenant need not run the risk usually inherent in
constructive eviction. He may have the premises inspected and ascertain
whether substantial code violations exist. Even if it is later judged that
no breach substantial enough to merit rent reduction ocurred, and ejectment is ordered, the tenant has at least enjoyed possession during the
interim period.
The cases examined typify three distinct approaches employed in
recent judicial assaults on caveat emptor in landlord-tenant law. The
potential consequences of each is yet unclear, though some conceptual
and remedial problems are presently apparent. It is hoped, however, that
further re-evaluation of the "obnoxious legal cliche" will flow from the
precedents now before the courts.
RICHARD A. LEIPPE
08Diamond

Housing Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A.2d 492, 495 (D.C. App. 1969).
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(Denver, Colo. County Ct. 1970).
0428 F.2d at 1082. See also Bonner v. Beecham, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP.

